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Carefreeness and Children’s Well-Being1 
 
(This is the penultimate version of a paper that is forthcoming in the Journal of Applied 
Philosophy) 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
What do children need in order to lead good lives? One familiar answer is that children need 
the opportunity to play, among other things. That is, children need the opportunity to engage 
in playful activities, which can include sports, make-believe, games, role-play, and 
unstructured exploration of their environment. This familiar answer finds expression in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which stipulates “that every child has the right to rest 
and leisure, to engage in play and recreational activities appropriate to [their age] and to 
participate freely in cultural life and the arts” (Art 31). In contrast, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which applies to persons of all ages, only mentions the right “to rest and 
leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay” 
(Art 24). So, it seems, play is understood by political leaders as a special good of childhood 
and not a special good of adulthood.  
 Philosophers too have found this familiar view quite compelling. Virtually everyone 
interested in philosophical questions relating to childhood believes that the activity of play is 
an important part of a childhood well lived. The disagreement amongst philosophers working 
on childhood is whether play is instrumentally or intrinsically valuable to a good life, and 
whether playing, broadly conceived, should be seen as a special good of childhood, or rather 
as a good that contributes to the well-being of any person, irrespective of their age.2 One 
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influential position in this debate has been put forward by Anca Gheaus, who claims that play 
is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable, and that not only children, but also adults, 
“should have the freedom to cultivate and enjoy capacities to learn and play a lot more than 
they are typically able to in highly competitive and efficiency-driven societies.”3 Gheaus does 
not go so far as to claim that the interest of adults to play rises to the level of a basic human 
right, but she supports policy proposals that would see society being arranged such that adults 
are given meaningful opportunities for playing if that is something they are attracted to.4   
 In this essay, I want to take this debate in a different direction. My aim here is 
twofold. First, insofar as play is widely seen as a special good of childhood, I want to 
investigate the relationship between play and another good typically associated with 
childhood; the good of carefreeness. Moreover, because it is plausible to hold that play does 
not exhaust a good childhood, I also want to investigate the relationship between carefreeness 
and other valuable childhood goods. Indeed, other goods that are not directly aimed at 
protecting and promoting the bodily interests of the child, such as loving relationships and 
education, are also valuable childhood goods, even if not special childhood goods. Here I 
want to suggest that carefreeness counts as a precondition for all these childhood goods to 
constitute a good childhood, while not counting as a precondition for adults to enjoy a good 
adulthood. By looking closely at the relationship between carefreeness, play and other 
childhood goods, I hope to mount a compelling case for the conclusion that carefreeness is a 
necessary component of a good childhood.  
 The discussion is structured as follows. In part I, I make some preliminary points 
about the definition and value of childhood. In part II, I set the stage for the discussion by 
endorsing a hybrid view of well-being, one that takes both objective goods, and subjective 
endorsement of these goods as jointly necessary for a life to go well. In part III, I defend an 
account of carefreeness that I believe best captures the significance of carefreeness and the 
role it plays in the pursuit of a good life. In part IV, I move on to the relationship between 
carefreeness and the lives of children. I show that the psychological disposition of 
carefreeness is a precondition for valuable goods to constitute a good childhood. One upshot 
of my discussion is that a child who is allowed to play, who receives an adequate education, 
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and who has loving parents, but who lacks the psychological disposition of carefreeness leads 
an impoverished life, even if she might lead a good life in adulthood.5  
 
I – Preliminary Points  
 
For the purposes of this essay, I will operate with a narrow understanding of childhood, 
which sees childhood as starting sometime after infancy, with the development of basic social 
skills and self-awareness, and ending sometime around puberty, when so-called adolescence 
begins and the adolescent can take on a subset of rights and responsibilities of adulthood 
(e.g., working and training for a profession). This means that I am primarily interested in 
creatures that have began to develop their practical reasoning skills, but have not developed 
them to a degree such that they can take on some or all of the rights and responsibilities of 
adulthood. This means that I am silent on what it takes for babies, toddlers and adolescents to 
live well.6  
 Another important point to note is that I will not be focusing on the well-being of 
children qua future adults. Instead, I will focus on the goods that make a childhood go well, 
and that either enable a good adulthood or have mere trivial negative impacts on it. The 
justification for this focus on what is good for children qua children is that we should neither 
render childhood subservient to a good adulthood, nor render adulthood subservient to a good 
childhood. For instance, a child that is not allowed to play misses a core aspect of a good life 
even if that makes her excel in some professional domain later on in life. Similarly, a child 
that is not exposed to any degree of hardship in childhood is placed in a position of 
psychological vulnerability in adulthood even if such lack of hardship enables an idyllic form 
of childhood. In both cases, there is a trade-off between a good childhood and a good 
adulthood that we have both moral and prudential reasons to avoid. Anca Gheaus makes the 
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point more strongly: “if it is desirable that we start life as children, then it is important that 
we enjoy the things that make for a good childhood even if not all these things will also be 
conductive to a good adulthood – indeed, even if enjoying the goods of childhood was to 
jeopardise some of the goods of adulthood.”7  
 
II- On Well-being  
 
With these preliminary points about children and childhood in mind, we can now move on to 
the topic of well-being. The philosophical literature on this topic is primarily interested in 
answering the following question: what does it mean for human lives to go well? This 
literature can be roughly divided in three main camps. Some theorists focus on facts about a 
person’s circumstances that make her life go well.8 Other theorists focus instead on facts 
about a person’s mental states.9 Finally, some theorists defend hybrid accounts of well-being, 
which combine subjective and objective elements.10  
 One particularly promising version of a hybrid theory defends the position that an 
agent leads a good life insofar as facts about her circumstances combine with her mental 
states in an appropriate way. Moreover, this version of the hybrid theory requires that 
fulfilling both an objective and a subjective condition are jointly necessary for well-being.11 
In this section, I lend support to such ‘joint necessity’ hybrid accounts by briefly surveying 
what I take to be the most compelling arguments in their favour. Although I lack the space to 
discuss the merits of alternative accounts, I hope to convince the reader that ‘joint necessity’ 
hybrid accounts of well-being are quite promising, and that we have good reasons to theorise 
about children’s well-being under the assumption that they are in fact correct. 
 So what can be said in favour of ‘joint necessity’ hybrid accounts? In recent decades, 
a number of philosophers have endorsed the position that subjective and objective elements 
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are jointly necessary for a life well lived. Joseph Raz, for instance, makes it clear that the 
objective value of a person’s life goals is not all that matters when assessing how well her life 
goes. The question of whether such goals are endorsed by the agent also matters when we are 
in the business of assessing how his or her life goes. As he puts it, “[Such goals] contribute to 
a person’s well-being because they are his goals, they are what matters to him.”12 Susan Wolf 
argues that a good life is a meaningful life, and that meaning arises when we engage in 
projects and relationships that are both subjectively and objectively attractive.13 In a similar 
vein, Shelly Kagan defends the view that well-being requires that one’s enjoyment be 
properly connected to objective goods.14  
To illustrate: if it is equally morally good for a 10-year-old child that she learns a 
second language or owns a dog, but her parents can only afford one of these projects, it seems 
quite plausible that the subjective importance she attaches to each project should guide their 
decision-making process. Indeed, an account of well-being that recommends to the parents 
that they simply flip a coin seem to miss a core element of what it means for a life to go well. 
Equally, an account of well-being that recommends to the parents that they take the child’s 
preferences into account, but that her preferences merely adds to her overall well-being does 
not seem to take seriously the necessity of endorsement for a project or relationship to 
constitute a good childhood. A relationship with a dog will constitute a good life only if the 
child delights in the companionship of a dog, but not if she is uncomfortable around animals. 
Similarly, the ability to speak another language and engage in depth with another culture will 
constitute a good life only if the child has a sociable disposition and is curious about other 
cultures, but not if she is an introvert who shows no interest in cultural diversity.  (Note that 
because children are appropriate targets of paternalistic intervention, some valuable goods 
will need to be secured by parents and the state irrespective of whether the child is in fact 
subjectively attracted to them. This does not change the fact that were the child to become 
subjectively attracted to such projects and relationships, they would also contribute, in a 
constitutive manner, to her leading a good childhood). 
Finally, support for ‘joint necessity’ hybrid accounts of well-being can be found in the 
work of proponents of the capabilities approach, which aims at providing an account of well-
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being for the purposes of securing human development and achieving social justice.15 For 
these theorists, subjective attraction to valuable doings and beings is constitutive of well-
being. Indeed, theorists working on the question of which capabilities matter morally have 
focused their attention on the capabilities that allow persons to achieve valuable functionings, 
rather than any capability, such as the capability to get sunburnt or count grass in one’s 
backyard. Moreover, such valuable functionings are taken to be a function of what persons 
have reasons to value.16 But unlike standard objective list theories which focus solely on the 
ingredients of a good life, the capabilities approach supports the claim that a life goes well 
insofar as the valuable functionings that are achieved are in fact endorsed by the agent. As 
Serena Olsaretti explains, “On this view, it is necessary both that certain objects that are 
present in one’s life be valuable (where their being valuable is not a function of the person’s 
attitude), and that one deem them in some way valuable for oneself.”17  
To return to the example of the parents deciding how to benefit their offspring, we can 
claim that a child achieves the valuable functioning of affiliation with another species if she 
is given a dog after expressing a desire to care for one, rather than being forced to own a dog 
because her parents are themselves animal lovers. In contrast, a child does not achieve any 
valuable functioning when she convinces her parents to buy her a number of violent video 
games. In the first case, the functioning of being part of a cross species relationship 
contributes to a good life not only due the child’s endorsement but also due to the fact that 
there are agent-neutral reasons to value a friendship with a non-human animal. In the second 
case, the functioning of playing violent video games does not contribute to a good life despite 
the child’s endorsement since there are no agent-neutral reasons to value virtual violence. 
Endorsement of a set of childhood beings and doings are necessary but not sufficient for the 
pursuit of a good life since the functionings at stake must also be the sorts of things one has 
reasons to value.  
 As we have just seen, there are compelling arguments in support of the view that a 
good life requires both engagement with valuable goods, and some form of endorsement of 
such goods on the part of the agent. Moreover, such ‘joint necessity’ hybrid accounts can 
make sense of both adults’ and children’s well-being since both groups can and do engage 
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with valuable relationships and projects in the respective life stages they find themselves in, 
and both groups can and do endorse such relationships and projects to a lesser or greater 
extent. Or so I will argue in part IV. For now, I explore the implications of endorsing ‘joint 
necessity’ hybrid views of well-being for our understanding of the relationship between 
carefreeness and the pursuit of a good life.    
  
III – Carefreeness and Adulthood 
 
Before we get clear on how and why carefreeness matters, let me start by defining the state of 
being “carefree.” On a standard definition, to be carefree is to be free “from care or anxiety.” 
That is, a maximally carefree person is one that has nothing worrisome in her mind. She does 
not ever worry about the state of the economy, the possibility of a new world war, the 
likelihood of a breakdown in her marriage, etc. A person who is not at all carefree, on the 
other hand, is someone “experiencing worry or nervousness, typically about the future or 
something with an uncertain outcome; in a troubled or uneasy state of mind as a result of 
such worry.”18 
 There are two ways of understanding carefreeness. One can think of it as a state of 
mind at time t, or one can think of it as a psychological disposition. The two are obviously 
related, since a person who is disposed to worry, often finds herself in a worrisome state of 
mind, for instance. In this essay, I will take “being carefree” to mean having a mental life 
whereby an agent experiences the world without worry and responsibility to a significant 
extent even though there will be some moments where she experiences an array of negative 
emotions associated with stress and anxiety.  
 So what is required for someone to count as being carefree? I take it that carefree 
persons are sufficiently devoid of worry and responsibility partly due to their psychological 
make-up and partly due to their personal and socio-political circumstances. Some persons are 
much more prone to worry and stress than others, even when they have had similar 
upbringings and even when their life conditions are not significantly different. At the same 
time, however, personal and socio-political conditions play a key role in one’s ability to lead 
a carefree life. Being able to reliably enjoy personal projects or securely access the goods of 
intimate relationships is obviously important for finding oneself devoid of serious concerns. 
A person who loves cycling but lives in a city where cycling is extremely dangerous cannot 
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enjoy an important personal project without some degree of stress. Similarly, a person whose 
best friend is a war journalist cannot but feel constantly concerned about the whereabouts of 
her friend. And of course, being able to provide for one’s basic needs makes a significant 
difference to one’s ability to be carefree. A wealthy person living in an affluent state is in a 
much better position to lead a carefree life than a poor person living in a developing state, all 
else being equal.   
 Now, it could well be that there are coping strategies that can be developed by any 
person in any circumstance, making her capable of leading a carefree life irrespective of what 
is taking place in her life. I take it though that we are justified in assuming that such coping 
strategies are not always available, and that some agents might not find them desirable. The 
important philosophical question that arises for us is whether such lack of carefreeness affects 
their ability to lead good lives.  
  Before we can answer this question, it pays to revisit a core commitment of ‘joint 
necessity’ hybrid accounts of well-being: objectively valuable projects and relationship must 
be in some sense endorsed by the agent for them to contribute to a good life. This means that 
agents must feel that the valuable projects and relationships they engage in are in some 
important sense their own. Indeed, theorists defending hybrid accounts of well-being refer to 
enjoyment, pro-attitudes, subjective attraction, attachment of subjective importance, and a 
sense of ownership over valuable projects and relationships, all of which can be best captured 
by the language of endorsement.19 In fact, endorsement seems to be the most helpful notion in 
this literature since it encompasses both cognitive and affective responses.20 A schoolteacher 
will endorse her profession if she believes that she is a great educator or if she feels a great 
deal of joy and satisfaction around children (or both). Similarly, a crime journalist will fail to 
endorse his profession if he believes that he is a terrible writer or if he experiences a great 
deal of melancholy every time he covers a crime (or both). 
 Notice though that although endorsement can take place by both cognitive and 
affective means, the two can come apart in many instances. A schoolteacher might strongly 
believe that she is a great educator and yet feel uncomfortable around children. A crime 
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journalist might believe that he is unable to find information that goes beyond what has 
already been made public by the police, and yet feel excitement every time he works on a 
new story. This raises the question of whether there is in fact endorsement on the part of such 
agents, given that their beliefs and emotions pull them in different directions. I take it that in 
cases of this sort, either beliefs or emotions can do the trick, although endorsement will 
certainly be stronger in cases where both obtain. As I see it, compelling self-regarding 
reasons in favour of partaking in a valuable project or relationship can secure endorsement of 
a project or relationship even when all affective responses to it are negative. This is why the 
schoolteacher above endorses teaching as a vocation, despite not ‘enjoying’ the job. By the 
same token, one or more sufficiently strong positive affective responses to a valuable project 
or relationship can secure endorsement even when the agent struggles to find self-regarding 
reasons in their favour and lacks sufficiently strong reasons against it. This is why the 
journalist above endorses crime journalism as a profession despite struggling to find 
compelling self-regarding reasons that justify his long life devotion to journalism. 
So how does carefreeness enter into the picture? If carefreeness is a disposition not to 
feel stressed or worried, then carefreeness is not necessary for a good adulthood. After all, 
many adults endorse a life of worry and responsibility so as to realize valuable goods that 
they care deeply about. The South Sudanese humanitarian delivering aid in war torn South 
Sudan, the writer tapping into his own neuroses for writing brilliant books, the brain surgeon 
operating on the worst types of brain cancer will be leading good lives if is true that they have 
access to self-regarding reasons that lead them to endorse such projects despite the immense 
stress and anxiety that they cause. Indeed, the humanitarian worker knows that her vast 
cultural knowledge can render aid projects more effective. The writer knows that she has 
important stories to tell. The doctor knows that her perfectionism gives her patients a good 
shot at surviving. And of course, there is no denying that humanitarianism, literature and 
medicine are the sorts of objectively valuable projects that hybrid theorists believe can 
constitute a good life.   
 But if being carefree is not necessary for a good adulthood, then why do we think that 
adults also lose something important if they find themselves constantly worrying and feeling 
the weight of an array of life responsibilities? As is clear from the examples above, some 
people do choose, or benefit from, such a life, and it is not at all obvious that they deserve our 
pity. The neurotic writer might respond that if she were differently disposed, her novels 
wouldn’t be as deep and confronting. She might go as far as to claim that were she to become 
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carefree, she would be unable to write with any level of depth. The surgeon might raise a 
similar response. She might claim that the stakes in her job are simply too high for her to 
approach life in a carefree manner. What explains this, I think, is that an adult’s more 
complex evaluative capacity (i.e., capacity for self-reflection, capacity to acquire relevant 
moral knowledge, adequate sense of time, ability to recognize foreseeable costs, risks and 
opportunities attached to certain actions, and so on and so forth), allows her to be subjectively 
attracted to worthwhile projects even when positive affective responses to these projects are 
lacking. After all, human adults are the sorts of creatures that often give a great deal of 
weight to whether or not their goals are being achieved or fulfilled over time, and this can 
render them quite tolerant to an array of negative affective responses that may accompany the 
pursuit of such goals. This means that adults can be satisfied with their lives even if they do 
not feel happy with the projects they are currently engaged with.21 Indeed, the humanitarian 
worker in Sudan who finds her job stressful can step back and evaluate humanitarian 
assistance as a desirable project to engage in despite the stress involved. She might hope that 
the experience will set her up for a career in politics, land her a dream job at the United 
Nations, or simply make her a better, more compassionate, person.  
But how about persons who would like to be sufficiently carefree but cannot afford do 
so? Doesn’t that show that being carefree is in fact necessary to a good adulthood? I don’t 
think so. For a good to be necessary to the positive evaluation of a stage of life, it has to be 
the case that without that good, positive evaluation is not possible. And as we have just seen, 
we can in fact positively evaluate the lives of many adults who lack the disposition of being 
carefree. In fact, we can say that many adults lead wonderful lives despite not being carefree, 
and they do so because they choose a life that is inimical to carefreeness, or they believe that 
their difficult circumstances will enable the enjoyment of valuable goods that would not 
otherwise be available. 
At this stage of the discussion, it is important to make two observations. Carefreeness 
can of course make endorsement of valuable projects and relationships more likely simply by 
preventing core negative affective responses from arising. This does not lead us to the 
conclusion that carefreeness is necessary for endorsement on the part of adults, and therefore 
necessary for a good adult life. Second, my understanding of carefreeness departs 
significantly from other philosophical accounts on the topic. Anca Gheaus, for instance, 
claims that although carefreeness is more readily accessible to children, it is still available to, 
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and valuable for, adults. For Gheaus, carefreeness is the good of experiencing “trust and love 
wholeheartedly and unstructured time during which children engage in fantasy play, 
experimentation, and undirected exploration of the world and of their minds.”22 She also 
believes that the good of being carefree also makes for a good adulthood, despite it being 
obviously true that children typically find it easier to be carefree than adults do, and typically 
benefit more from enjoying this good than adults do. 
Gheaus and I clearly disagree about how to best conceive of the good of carefreeness. 
Gheaus understands carefreeness as the enjoyment of unstructured time, as well as 
engagement in fantasy play, experimentation, and undirected exploration of the world and of 
one’s mind. I, on the other hand, see it as a disposition that affects all the other pursuits in a 
person’s life, including her structured time. As I understand it, a carefree adult is an adult 
who is disposed to approach life in a carefree manner even when undertaking paid work, 
fulfilling caring responsibilities or engaging in any activity that requires a great degree of 
focus and responsibility. (Similarly, a carefree child is a child who does not frequently 
experience stress and anxiety, whether or not she is having unstructured fun, playing with 
friends, doing household chores or looking after a young sibling for a short period of time. I 
will return to the case of children in the next section). 
There might be one point of broad agreement between us, however. Although Gheaus 
is not explicit about this, at times she seems sympathetic to a ‘joint necessity’ hybrid theory 
of well-being since she makes clear that adults should not be forced to play.23 She might 
therefore believe that endorsement matters for a good life, which would mean that 
carefreeness is valuable for a person only if she endorses it.24  
Despite this potential point of agreement, Gheaus’ understanding of carefreeness as an 
objectively valuable set of activities will have as a result that they can contribute to the life of 
an adult in a way similar to things like loving relationships, pursuit of knowledge and 
aesthetic enterprises so long as persons are not forced by the state to lead a carefree life. That 
is, carefreeness will count as one of the many ingredients of an objective list aimed at 
describing what is in fact required for a person’s life to go well. By contrast, my 
understanding of carefreeness as a disposition does not allow for carefreeness to be on a par 
                                                
22  A. Gheaus, ‘Children's Vulnerability and Legitimate Authority Over Children,’ Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 35 (2018), 66. 
23  Gheaus, ‘The ‘Intrinsic Goods of Childhood’ and the Just Society,’ 38. 
24  Note that for Gheaus, the endorsement condition might not be necessary, but merely additive. 
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state neutrality. 
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with objectively valuable activities and projects. Rather, carefreeness as a disposition merely 
makes it easier for endorsement on the part of adults to take place by preventing negative 
affective responses to valuable projects and relationships. Carefreeness thereby plays at best 
an instrumental role in a ‘joint necessity’ hybrid account of adult well-being. But because 
endorsement of valuable projects and relationships can still take place via cognitive means 
alone, its instrumental role is in fact replaceable by agent-relative reasons for endorsement. 
To summarize the discussion so far. I have argued that we should understand 
carefreeness as a disposition that affects all the projects and relationships in a person’s life, 
rather than a set of activities that persons engage in. I have also argued that there are good 
reasons to believe that a good adult life requires that agents endorse the valuable projects they 
engage with either by acting on self-regarding reasons in their support or by displaying 
positive affective responses in their favour. This leads to the conclusion that carefreeness is 
not in fact necessary for a good adulthood. In the next section, I show that in the case of 
children, positive affective responses to valuable projects and relationships are in fact 
necessary for endorsement, and that this makes carefreeness necessary for a good childhood.  
  
IV – Carefreeness and a Good Childhood 
 
We are now in a position to argue for the claim that being carefree is necessary for a child to 
lead a good life. The idea here is this: a childhood full of stress and anxiety is necessarily 
impoverished even if it is full of other valuable properties. A child that receives a great level 
of education, has parents who love her, and is given ample opportunity to play still fails to 
lead a good childhood if her mental life is so constituted that she is never or rarely able to not 
feel concerned, worried or stressed. Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift get close to my own 
view of carefreeness in the following passage: 
 
Childhood is a period during which it is possible to enjoy being carefree, and not to 
have to bear responsibility for decisions about others or, to a considerable extent, 
one’s own interaction with the world (…) A child who knows that her participation 
in the labor market is essential for her family’s survival misses out on one of the 
special goods of childhood; so does the child who is the main carer for his severely 
epileptic parent.25 
                                                
25  H. Brighouse and A. Swift, Family values, 69. 
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To be sure, Brighouse and Swift don’t go as far as to claim that the children above don’t lead 
a good childhood as a result of their responsibilities towards their parents. What we are told 
in their discussion on carefreeness is that children who bear significant responsibility during 
childhood miss something of great value. The trouble, of course, is that this claim is 
compatible with the further claim that they could have made up for such a loss by accessing 
other special goods of childhood, or by appealing to self-regarding reasons that would secure 
a level of endorsement of their caring responsibilities.26 In what follows, I show that the 
children above don’t enjoy a good childhood precisely because their personal circumstances 
renders them unable to be carefree. I also show that precisely because these children are not 
carefree they can neither authoritatively endorse their caring responsibilities nor the other 
valuable goods in their lives.  
 The argument to follow has three premises, which I defend in detail below.  
 
P1.  A good childhood requires endorsement of the valuable goods that are present in one’s 
childhood  
P2. Endorsement requires positive affect in the case of children 
P3. A sufficient level of positive affect requires carefreeness  
C: A good childhood requires carefreeness  
 
The Case for P1.  
 
This is a philosophical premise, and one that I take to be fairly uncontroversial. As I already 
alluded to with the case of the parents deciding whether to give their child a dog or language 
lessons, it seems quite important for a theory of well-being to able to prescribe valuable 
projects and relationships for children to engage with, as well as require endorsement on their 
part. 
 For one, children find themselves in a position where they can adequately respond to 
a full array of valuable activities and relationships. That is, children can have real friendships, 
experience beauty qua beauty, play by themselves or with other children, and so on and so 
forth. Moreover, there is good reason to think that such projects and relationships contribute 
                                                
26  I am not suggesting that Brighouse and Swift defend this further claim in their work, but only 
noting that carefreeness needs to be both necessary and special in order for us to adequately refute it. 
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to a good childhood in a way that merely counting grass on the backyard or playing violent 
video games does not.  
Apart from being able to pursue valuable relationships and projects, pre-schoolers and 
children occupying the middle childhood range are able to endorse them to a greater or lesser 
extent. Some are attracted to music and want to learn an instrument, others would rather do 
something else with their time. Some are very sociable and love playing with other children, 
others are only comfortable playing by themselves. Despite the objective value of these 
activities being the same for each child, there is a great deal of variation in how much 
subjective attraction is at play. A theory of well-being that is oblivious to these variations 
fails to capture an important part of what it means for a childhood to go well.  
 None of this is to deny that because children are legitimate targets of paternalistic 
intervention by parents and the state, they will sometimes lack the choice about which 
valuable projects and relationships to engage with. But even when children have not had a 
say over some of the valuable goods in their childhoods, there is still a question about 
whether or not they have come to endorse them, which in turn, will affect whether or not such 
goods have contributed, in a constitutive manner, to them leading a good life.   
 
The Case for P2.  
   
The premise that endorsement requires positive affect in the case of children is also a 
philosophical premise, but it relies on empirical claims about how children respond to the 
valuable projects and relationships they engage with. The idea here is that unlike adults, 
children’s cognitive abilities are not sufficiently developed so as to produce, via cognitive 
means, authoritative endorsement of worthwhile projects and relationships. This means that 
when it comes to children, there is only authoritative endorsement via positive affect.  
Now, it is well known that children have different thought patterns and priorities than 
adults, but the question is why exactly this is the case. Psychologists specializing on 
childhood point to numerous factors. The most obvious one is that children have more limited 
life experience than adults, and so have less expertise to draw on in the course of their 
childhoods. But the difference between adults and children goes much further than the degree 
of expertise they have access to. There is also a significant difference in cognitive abilities 
between children and adults due to the former having relatively immature capacity for self-
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reflection and self-perception, high degree of optimism (which leads to an inability to 
realistically assess risks and costs), as well as an overestimation of their positive values.27 
  Indeed, such cognitive differences between adults and children have led Tamar 
Shapiro to refer to childhood as a predicament. In her discussion on the status of children, 
Shapiro calls attention to how a child lacks a “principled perspective which would count as 
the law of her will.”28 That is, a child doesn’t yet have a practical identity with a realistic 
insight into her values (and their overall ranking), so as to be able to authoritatively 
adjudicate between conflicting motivational claims. Of course, children can appreciate 
reasons for and against different actions, but they cannot adequately evaluate these reasons in 
light of established values and moral beliefs, for they don’t yet possess values that are 
sufficiently established, nor a fully developed capacity to acquire relevant moral knowledge 
and engage in complex moral reasoning. This is why we take children to be appropriate 
targets of paternalistic intervention, and do not believe they are wronged for being denied the 
opportunity to make important decisions about their lives.    
 This difference between the authority of the judgments of children and adults about 
their own good is a crucial step in the argument. When discussing endorsement of valuable 
projects and relationships on the part of adults, I merely pointed out that when positive 
affective responses are lacking, adults can still identify self-regarding reasons in their favor. 
That is, the humanitarian worker in Sudan who is anxious about the activities associated with 
her profession can still appeal to the value of becoming a better person as her reason for 
persevering with that type of work. But of course, for that reason to be hers in any 
meaningful sense, we must presuppose an agent that has sufficient moral knowledge that is 
relevant to the case at hand, an adequate sense of what kind of person she is, what she would 
like to achieve in her life, a good sense of time and what it means to commit to a project for a 
certain period of time, the risks, costs and opportunities involved with different life choices, 
and so on and so forth. This means that when she identifies whatever self-regarding reason in 
support of being a humanitarian worker, she has gone through a complex deliberative process 
that allows us to say that the reason in question is indeed her own. As Shapiro puts it, an adult 
                                                
27  P. C. Scales, ‘Developmental assets and the promotion of well-being in middle childhood,’ 
Handbook of child well-being: Theories, methods and policies in global perspective (2014), 1671. See 
also S. Hannan, ‘Why childhood is bad for children’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (2018): 11-28. 
28  T. Schapiro, ‘What Is a Child?’ Ethics 109 (1999), 729. 
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“is one who is in a position to speak in her own voice, the voice of one who stands in 
determinate, authoritative relation to the various motivational forces within her.”29  
 For comparison, imagine a 9-year-old child who volunteers at the local kitchen soup 
every day for two hours. Let us imagine that the work does not jeopardize any of her core 
interests. Now suppose that she finds it stressful, but believes that that just like her parents, it 
is her life call to serve the needs of others. What shall we make of this reason? Should we 
take it as authoritative in the way we would take the reason of an adult doing a similar type of 
work? 
 If we take the cognitive limitations of children seriously, then we cannot possibly trust 
that this reason is the outcome of an adequate deliberative process. This child might believe 
that she values charity but in reality she is just trying out that identity for the time being, and 
will soon move on to experimenting with a new one. Or she might con-culpably hold the 
clearly false belief that morality requires children to volunteer on a daily basis. She might 
also underestimate the opportunity costs associated with volunteer work, by not realizing that 
two hours each day will take away precious time playing with an older sibling who will soon 
move out of home.  
At this stage, it is important to be careful not to let our pro-attitudes in favor of charity 
obscure the fact that this child’s reason lacks in authority. If she wanted to leave school so as 
to spend the whole day volunteering so as to serve the needs of others, we would 
wholeheartedly object. But the only way we can consistently prevent a child from devoting 
her whole life to charity without simultaneously preventing an adult doing the same is by 
appealing to the fact that only the adult’s deliberative capacities are able to produce 
authoritative reasons in support of valuable projects and relationships. Moreover, one thing is 
clear; if we take children’s deliberative capacity as authoritative due to the fact that they can 
sometimes produce good reasons in favor of worthwhile projects, we cannot but take bad 
reasons in favor of worthless projects as authoritative as well. They are after all produced by 
the same psychological process or mechanism. This will in effect spell out the end of justified 
comprehensive paternalism towards children.30  
 Does this mean that endorsement is not possible in the case of children? Not at all. 
Recall that endorsement can take place via positive affect, and that children can come to 
endorse a project or relationship on the basis that it produces joyfulness, satisfaction, 
                                                
29  Ibid.  
30   We might only be able to justify the same level of paternalism towards children that can be 
justified towards adults.   
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pleasure, amusement, and delight. These positive affective responses might not be enough to 
render children immune from paternalistic intervention (for it seems that paternalism tracks a 
lack of authority over one’s reasons rather than a lack of endorsement of one’s projects and 
relationships), but it is certainly enough for assessments over how well their childhood go. 
The child who delights on her volunteer work engages with a project that no doubt 
contributes, in a constitutive manner, to her leading a good childhood.  
 
The Case for P3.  
 
The premise that a sufficient level of positive affect requires carefreeness is fully empirical. 
Social psychologists have identified that positive and negative affect are not independent 
from each other at any given period of time. According to one expert “each type of affect 
clearly tends to suppress the other, although the mechanism by which this occurs is not yet 
clearly understood. [Moreover], because of the suppressive mechanism, the two types of 
affect are not independent in terms of their frequency of occurrence.”31 In other words, the 
more a person feels positive affect, the less she will feel negative affect, and vice versa.  
 This suppression mechanism could explain, for example, why children who report to 
feeling happy are more likely to perform well academically, for their happiness allows them 
to develop positive affective responses to schooling and education.32 It could also explain 
why children who report to feeling happy show more imagination and creativity during play, 
for their happiness allows them to develop positive affective responses to play.33 That is, 
carefreeness creates space for children to authoritatively endorse the valuable projects and 
relationships in their lives. Stress and anxiety have the exact opposite effect.34   
                                                
31     E. Diener, ‘Subjective well-being,’ 548. See also E. Diener et al, ‘Intensity and Frequency: 
Dimensions Underlying Positive and Negative Affect,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
48 (1985): 1253-1265.  
32   P. D. Quinn, and A. L. Duckworth, ‘Happiness and academic achievement: Evidence for 
reciprocal causality,’ In Poster Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological 
Society (2007). 
33    A. Holte, et al. “Psychology of Child Well-Being,” Handbook of child well-being: Theories, 
methods and policies in global perspective (2014), 596. 
34  Here I do not conceive of a lack of carefreeness as a mental illness. This is for two reasons. 
First, some children are not carefree purely due to their circumstances. Second, recent empirical 
evidence “indicates that the determinants of wellbeing are in many instances different from the 
determinants of mental illness,” in P. Patalay and E. Fitzsimons, ‘Correlates of mental illness and 
wellbeing in children: are they the same? Results from the UK Millennium Cohort Study,’ Journal of 
the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 55 (2016), 781. 
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 Notice though that the mere fact that highly stressed and anxious children will at 
times display positive affective responses to valuable projects and relationships will not 
suffice for endorsement. The valuable projects and relationships that contribute to a 
meaningful life extend across a non-trivial period of time, or are in fact on-going. For 
positive affective responses to count as endorsement, they have to be present most of the time 
in which they are pursued. A child who only occasionally feels happy in the playground or 
the classroom does not in fact endorse play or education, since what is actually needed is that 
she feels this way most of the time in which she pursues these valuable projects. 35 
  This completes my case for the conclusion that carefreeness is a necessary good of a 
childhood well lived because children need to have enough mental space for developing 
positive affective responses that secure endorsement of worthwhile projects and relationships. 
Unlike adults who can endorse worthwhile goods merely due to how well they fit with their 
life goals, children’s endorsement are authoritatively mediated via their affective responses. 
Children will therefore fail to endorse play, loving relationships, and education, when they 
are constantly finding themselves worried or stressed. So, although we can concede that 
many children in stressful circumstances still have access to valuable goods, we shouldn’t be 
naïve in thinking that they by themselves constitute a good childhood. If we want children to 
lead good lives qua children, they must be carefree.  
 
                                                
35  This is not to deny that play or education are instrumentally valuable for this child, but rather 
to affirm that without sufficient positive affective responses on her part, they will not count as 
intrinsic goods of her childhood. Being carefree is required for endorsement of the valuable goods of 
childhood, and so required for them to constitute a good childhood. 
